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ABSTRACT 
The economical benefits of applying risk-based inspection 
planning (RBI) for offshore structures subject to fatigue are 
evaluated based on experiences from past industrial projects. 
To this end, the factors influencing the cost of inspection, repair 
and failure of structures are discussed and realistic values of 
these costs are presented. These are then applied to assess the 
expected costs from different inspection strategies, both risk-
based strategies as well as inspection strategies with fixed 
inspection intervals for all potentially critical elements. By 
comparing these expected costs, the financial benefit of RBI is 
assessed. 
INTRODUCTION 
For offshore structures, risk and reliability based 
inspection planning (RBI) procedures have been developed and 
implemented since the 1980s, mostly for fatigue deterioration 
of fixed jacket steel structures, Skjong (1985), Madsen et al. 
(1989) and Fujita et al. (1989), but more recently also for ship 
and floating production storage and offloading systems subject 
to corrosion and fatigue, Lotsberg et al. (1999) and Goyet et al. 
(2004). While the significant computational efforts required by 
RBI hindered the applications in the past, this restriction has 
been resolved with the development of the generic approach to 
RBI, see Faber et al. (2000), Straub (2004), Faber et al. (2005) 
and Straub and Faber (2006), which facilitates the highly 
efficient application of RBI for portfolios of offshore structure.  
Although it has been observed that RBI in general reduces 
the amount of inspections considerably, Moan et al. (2000), the 
financial benefits of applying RBI strategies for offshore 
structures have not been systematically quantified in past 
publications. Furthermore, in the public domain little 
information is available on realistic estimates of costs related to 
the structural integrity management of these structures. As an 
example, in Dalane et al. (1990) the resulting expected cost for 
different designs and inspection strategies are compared for 
example details in fixed and floating offshore structures, yet 
without presenting the underlying cost model. 
In this paper, the factors influencing the costs of 
inspections and repairs are reviewed. Based on past experience, 
typical costs of different types of inspections and repair actions 
are presented for fixed and floating offshore steel structures, 
including FPSO’s, subject to fatigue damages. Furthermore, the 
factors influencing the cost of a failure in the structure are 
discussed. On this basis, the financial benefits of performing 
risk based inspection planning are determined for some typical 
cases by comparing the associated expected costs with the 
expected cost of an inspection strategy with fixed, predefined 
inspection intervals. This assessment is based on the generic 
approach to RBI. 
INSPECTION STRATEGIES 
The potential inspection strategies can be divided into 
three groups, namely prescriptive strategies, qualitative 
strategies and quantitative risk-based strategies. 
Prescriptive (or rule-based) inspection planning  
Prescriptive inspection plans require that inspections are 
performed for all joints in the structure at fixed intervals in 
time. Such rule-based inspection planning is still commonly 
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applied in the offshore industry. Its main advantage is that it 
does not require further structural and risk analysis of the 
structure. Additionally, it may facilitate the planning of the 
logistic aspects of the inspection campaigns, because the 
number of inspections in each campaign can easily be adjusted 
to the available inspection capacities. Rule-based strategies are 
thus defined completely by the inspection interval . InspTΔ
Partly risk-based inspection strategies (qualitative or 
semi quantitative risk-based strategies) 
Some owners and operators of offshore structures 
implement an inspection policy which corresponds to a 
combination of the rule-based and the RBI approach, i.e., they 
apply inspection strategies which are partly risk-based. These 
strategies prescribe inspection intervals separately for groups of 
joints, in accordance with the considered qualitative and/or 
quantitative risk indicators. As an example, in Pemex (2000), 
inspection intervals are determined for fixed steel platforms as 
a function of various indicators, including the member 
importance (primary, secondary or tertiary member) and the 
calculated fatigue life.  
These partly risk-based inspection strategies are not 
considered explicitly in this paper. It is argued that although 
strategies based on qualitative indicators are preferable to 
purely prescriptive inspection planning strategies, they do have 
similar disadvantages. This holds in particular when 
considering fatigue deterioration, as qualitative indicators are 
poor in describing fatigue performance. Partly risk-based 
inspection strategies, which are based on quantitative indicators 
(such as the calculated fatigue life) are not treated in the 
following, as it is argued that with the availability of these 
indicators it is preferable to perform a fully quantitative RBI, 
as, once the indicators are available, the additional effort for 
such an analysis is small, as outlined in the following section. 
RBI strategies (quantitative risk-based strategies) 
RBI strategies are based on the priorization of inspection 
efforts in accordance with the risk reduction efficiency of the 
different alternative inspection actions. Ideally, such strategies 
should be based on the preposterior analysis of the Bayesian 
decision theory. In the following, the RBI model presented in 
Straub (2004) and Straub and Faber (2006) is summarized and 
subsequently applied for the numerical investigations; the 
practical application of similar models has been reported in, 
e.g., Pedersen et al (1992), Moan et al. (2000), Faber et al. 
(2005) or Chakrabarti et al. (2005).  
The deterioration mechanisms are represented by 
stochastic models of the defect size as a function of time, ( )tS . 
For fatigue, ( )tS is the crack depth and length as evaluated by 
a probabilistic fracture mechanics based model. Inspection 
qualities are commonly represented by a Probability of 
Detection (PoD) curve and a Probability of False Indication 
(PFI), which describe the likelihood of an inspection outcome 
given the state of the inspected component. Based on the PoD 
and PFI, structural reliability analysis or simulation techniques 
facilitate the updating of any deterioration model in the 
presence of an inspection outcome through the application of 
Bayes’ rule, as demonstrated by Madsen (1987). Through the 
assumption of no-indication at the inspections, the required 
inspection times to comply with a given threshold on the 
acceptable annual failure probability can be determined, as 
illustrated in Figure 1 for thresholds 10-3 yr-1 and 10-4 yr-1. The 
assumption of no-indication implies that mitigation measures 
(repair, monitoring, follow-up inspections) are taken in case a 
defect is indicated at any of the inspections. The fact that 
inspection intervals increase with time reflects the increased 
confidence in the fatigue performance of the hot spot after the 
inspections. 
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Figure 1. Inspection times as determined from the 
application of Bayes’ rule, from Straub (2004) 
 
The calculated probabilities can be applied to determine 
inspection strategies that comply with given risk acceptance 
criteria. Additionally, it is possible to assess the expected costs 
associated with a given threshold and therefore identify the 
optimal threshold (and thus the optimal inspection strategy), as 
illustrated in Figure 2. This optimization follows the principles 
of the Bayesian preposterior decision analysis according to 
Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961).  
The probability calculations required for RBI are 
computationally very demanding, especially for fatigue 
problems. In the past, this has hindered the application of the 
RBI methodology in practice. The generic approach to RBI was 
developed to overcome these limitations. The core of the 
generic approach to RBI is the pre-fabrication of inspection 
plans for generic hot spots which are representative for the 
particular hot spots1 in the considered structures. These pre-
fabricated plans are termed Generic Inspection Plans. All hot 
spots that are represented by the model are fully described by 
the so-called generic parameters. These are the input 
parameters to the model that vary from one hot spot to the next 
and which are indicators of the relevant deterioration 
mechanism. For structures subjected to fatigue, typical 
                                                          
1 Hot spots are the potential locations for fatigue failures.  
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examples of such generic parameters are, e.g., the calculated 
design fatigue life TFL (respectively the dimensionless Fatigue 
Design Factor FDF2), other loading characteristics (such as the 
shape of the distribution describing the stress ranges at the hot 
spots), the applied SN curve (which is representative for the 
detail type and the environment) and geometrical parameters 
such as the wall thickness at the hot spot.  
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Figure 2. Optimization of inspection efforts, from 
Straub (2004). 
 
Once the generic inspection plans are calculated, the 
inspection plans for the specific hot spots in a structure can be 
obtained by an interpolation of the generic plans, see Straub 
and Faber (2006) for details on the procedure. For this task, 
software tools such as iPlan, see Faber et al. (2005), can be 
developed. Because the generic parameters are obtained from 
standard fatigue evaluation procedures, the RBI can, in 
principle, be performed without specialist knowledge once the 
generic inspection plans are available. In this way, the RBI is 
easily integrated in the daily asset integrity management 
procedures of the owner or operator of the structure.  
As an example consider Figure 3: The inspections required 
to comply with given acceptance criteria are here shown as a 
function of the generic parameter FDF, i.e., for fixed values of 
all other parameters, the inspection times are obtained as a 
function of the FDF. Similarly the expected costs can be 
expressed as a function of the FDF, Figure 4. The calculations 
are based on marginal costs of failure , cost of repair 
, cost of inspection  and an interest rate 
. 
1FC =
0.01RC = 0.001IC =
-10.05yrr =
 
                                                          
2 The FDF is a deterministic safety factor, defined as the ratio of the 
calculated design fatigue life to the design service life. 
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Figure 3. Inspection times as a function of the FDF for 
a target reliability 10-4 yr-1, Straub (2004). 
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Figure 4. Expected cost as a function of the FDF for a 
target reliability 10-4 yr-1, Straub (2004). 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF FATIGUE PERFORMANCE IN 
OFFSHORE STRUCTURES 
Offshore structures are subject to fatigue mainly due to 
environmental loads (waves). In addition, parts of the structure 
are subjected to fatigue loads from machinery or other 
operational loadings. Typically, fatigue performance is assessed 
in terms of the fatigue design life (or the FDF) as calculated 
using the SN approach. The FDF is a main indicator for the 
fatigue performance and the required inspection efforts. In the 
following, we focus entirely on the FDF when describing the 
fatigue performance of offshore structures. Other generic 
parameters (such as the uncertainty in the load modeling) also 
have a large influence on the fatigue performance and/or the 
required inspection times, however, these other parameters 
often are the same for the entire structure or do not vary much 
from one hot spot to the next. For the comparative study 
presented later, it is sufficient to assume that these other 
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parameters are the same for all fatigue hot spots in the 
structure. 
Fixed steel structures 
As an example, Figure 5 shows the distribution of FDFs 
calculated for 4 steel jacket structures built in the late 1970s in 
the Gulf of Mexico. The platforms are all eight-leg drilling 
platforms with an anticipated service life of 35 to 36 years. The 
fatigue calculations were performed as part of the reassessment 
study described in Chakrabarti et al. (2005). A majority of the 
hot spots have a FDF larger than 10. For those, no inspections 
will be required according to the RBI (see Figure 3), but also 
according to standards such as NORSOK (1998) or API (2002). 
The distribution of the FDFs provides an indication of the 
fatigue strength of the installation and will be decisive for the 
required inspection efforts following an RBI approach. 
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Figure 5. Distribution of FDFs observed on 2 steel 
jacket structures. 
 
It is noted that the fatigue performances of the individual 
hot spots are dependent, in particular for similar types of details 
in adjacent locations in the structure. This inter-dependency 
allows considering system effects in the planning of 
inspections, which may reduce the amount of required 
inspections, see Straub and Faber (2005). 
Floating structures 
Floating structures include FPSOs (Floating Production, 
Storage and Offloading units) but also semi-submersible 
platforms. Whereas the fatigue assessment for floating 
platforms can be considered in analogy to the assessment for 
fixed structures, the fatigue assessment for FPSOs is different 
due to the large amount of hot spots (potential locations of 
fatigue failures) in the structure and due to the large 
redundancy of the structure. For the same reasons, the 
consideration of inter-dependency between the fatigue 
performances of the individual hot spots is even more relevant 
for floating structures than for fixed structures. 
Figure 6 shows exemplarily the distribution of FDFs as 
calculated for 2 units. The first one is a conversion, i.e. a tanker 
converted into a FPSO, while the second is a purpose-built 
FPSO. For the conversion, the presented FDF values represent 
hot spots in 3 cargo tanks located in the aft part, the midship 
part and the fore part respectively. The number of the web 
frames in these 3 tanks is 9 (3 per tank) and the total number of 
welded connections is slightly higher than 1050. The fatigue 
calculations underlying these FDF values are described in 
Goyet et all. (2004). Based on the results of these calculations, 
only 96 welded connections (about 9% of the total) were 
considered in the detailed RBI analysis (all hot spots with 
FDF<8). Thereby, the critical welded connections in this FPSO 
are situated as follows: 
- Side shell longitudinals: 71 
- Longitudinal bulkhead longitudinals: 23 
- Bottom longitudinal: 1 
- Bracket toe weld: 1 
In the second FPSO, the FDF values presented in Figure 6 
are located in a condensate tank and a water ballast tank. The 
number of the web frames is 11 and the total number of welded 
connections is higher than 1500. The fatigue calculations lead 
to a selection of 294 welded connections (about 19% of the 
total) for further detailed RBI analysis, which are situated as 
follows: 
- Side shell longitudinals: 74 
- Longitudinal Bulkhead (side) longitudinals: 5 
- Bottom longitudinals: 215 
It is pointed at the fact that the critical connections are 
located at different areas in the two FPSOs (in the side shell 
longitudinals respectively the bottom longitudinals). This 
indicates the difficulty in identifying the relevant hot spots for 
inspection without detailed fatigue calculations. 
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Figure 6. Distribution of FDFs observed in 5 different 
tanks on 2 FPSOs. 
 
COST OF INSPECTION, REPAIR AND FAILURE OF 
OFFSHORE STRUCTURES 
The cost-relevant activities and events included in the 
optimization of the inspection efforts are the inspections 
themselves, with associated cost I , repair actions with costs 
 and failure of individual hot spots with cost . Inspection 
C
RC FC
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planning is a time-dependent problem, as inspections and 
repairs at an earlier time will prevent failures at a later time. 
Therefore, an interest rate r  is included in the analysis. The 
cost of the individual actions and events is highly dependent on 
the type of structure and operation. In the following, the factors 
influencing the cost of inspection, repair and failure are thus 
discussed separately for steel platforms and FPSOs. 
Cost on offshore steel platforms 
A large part of the cost of inspecting joints in steel 
platforms is related to accessing the hot spots. This holds in 
particular for the joints which are situated below sea-level and 
in the splash zone. Below sea level, fatigue inspections require 
removal of the marine growth, which is a time consuming task. 
In the splash zone, accessing the hot spots may be very difficult 
or even impossible, depending on the weather conditions. 
Because of the limited availability of ships and inspectors, the 
inspections must be planned well in advance and cannot 
account for the weather. A main cost factor is the ship which 
carries both equipment and inspectors. Often a Dynamic 
Positioning Ship is required, with associated cost in the order 
of 10’000US$ per day. When inspecting joints below sea-level, 
approximately 8 joints may be inspected per day, so that, as a 
rough estimate, it can be assumed that the total cost of 
inspecting a hot spot, including ship, personnel and equipment 
cost, is C  = 2’000US$. I
For repair actions, the cost factors are similar to those for 
inspections, but, depending on the type of repair, the required 
time to perform a repair can vary substantially. If a small crack 
is found, it can be removed simply by grinding, which may be 
performed directly by the inspector in very little extra time. If a 
larger defect is found, the necessary equipment and personnel 
may not be available and must be brought to place at an extra 
cost. Alternatively, an engineering assessment and follow-up 
inspections may be performed. Considering these factors, it is 
estimated that the average cost of repairing a major defect is 
 = 20’000US$. RC
In addition to the direct cost, the inspection and repair 
activities represent a significant risk for the involved personnel, 
in particular when joints are inspected by divers. This risk 
should be taken into account when assessing compliance of an 
inspection/maintenance strategy with given risk acceptance 
criteria. 
The cost of failure of a hot spot, FC , depends on the 
importance of the associated members. The importance of 
member failure can be expressed by the conditional probability 
of global collapse given member failure, 
iCOLF
. This 
probability can be estimated by the use of a simple indicator; 
the Residual Influence Factor (RIF), see Stahl et al. (2000) and 
Straub and Faber (2005a). The RIF is defined as the ratio 
between the Reserve Strength Ratio (RSR) of the intact 
structure and the RSR of the damaged structure, which is 
assessed by removing the element  in the pushover analysis. 
Using a general probabilistic model it is possible to relate the 
RIF for a particular hot spot to 
p
i
iCOLF
p , Figure 7. The 
(expected) cost of the failure of hot spot i  is then derived from 
the cost of structural collapse, , as:  COLC
( ) ( )
i iF iCOL F COLF
C p RIF p RSR⎡ COLC⎤= − ⋅⎢ ⎥   (1) ⎣ ⎦
Equation (1) is based on the assumption that failures do not 
occur in several hot spots simultaneously. This assumption does 
only hold if general visual inspections are held in regular 
intervals, ensuring the detection of failed members, see Straub 
and Faber (2003).  
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Figure 7. Relation between the RIF and the annual 
probability of collapse for a steel jacket in the Gulf of 
Mexico with an RSR = 1.63.   
 
The cost of platform collapse, COLC , is difficult to 
estimate. Construction costs of typical offshore steel platforms 
are in the order of 20-30 106 US$. However, if the loss of 
production cannot be compensated by other installations in the 
field, it may result in costs of an order of magnitude higher. As 
an example, the cost of the loss of Petrobras’ P-36 semi-
submersible rig in 2001 has been estimated as 500 106 US$, 
Goldman Sachs (2004). In addition, catastrophic events may 
also lead to a loss of reputation, which is very difficult to 
quantify. On the other hand, most structures are insured and 
failure costs are, therefore, compensated. However, because the 
insurance premiums will depend on risk mitigation actions 
implemented by the operator (at least theoretically), it is argued 
that compensation by insurance companies should not be 
included in the cost-benefit analysis. For the examples 
presented in the latter, two cases are considered: COLC = 30 10
6 
US$ and COLC = 300 10
6 US$. The cost of a hot spot failure, 
calculated by applying Equation (1) and the relation given in 
Figure 7, is given in Table 1 for different RIFs: 
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Table 1. Expected cost of hot spot failure as a 
function of the RIF and the cost of collapse. 
RIF COLC = 30 10
6 US$ COLC = 300 10
6 US$ 
0.95 6’000 US$ 57’000 US$ 
0.9 14’000 US$ 138’000 US$ 
0.8 43’000 US$ 433’000 US$ 
0.5 688’000 US$ 6’879’000 US$ 
 
Note that fatalities are not considered here, as these must 
be taken care of by risk acceptance criteria, which are based on 
the preferences of society, see Rackwitz (2002) and Kübler and 
Faber (2002).  
Cost on FPSOs 
In analogy to platforms, a major contribution to inspection 
and repair costs is from assessing the hot spots. The costs for 
the inspection of an example tank are: 
- 8000US$ for COW (Crude Oil Washing), water wash and 
to purge/gas free the tank, activities which are required for 
accessing the tank. 
- 4000US$ for a visual inspection of the lower area. 
- 70’000US$ for visual inspection of the upper area using 
rope access. 
- 5000US$ for Non-destructive testing (NDT) of 10 hot spots 
in the tank. 
Note that these costs are not exclusively related to fatigue 
inspections, but include inspections for other types of 
degradation (such as painting/coating checks and thickness 
measurements). Assuming that all other inspections are fixed, 
the cost which is associated with the inspection of one hot spot 
may be estimated as C = 500US$. I
The cost of a repair is related to the cleaning and the repair 
action itself. For an example hot spot, the related costs are: 
- 2500$ for the local cleaning before the repair.  
- 1500$ for a repair including a drill stop, gouging and 
welding. 
- 15’000$ for an insert repair (replacing a steel plate). Note 
that this cost is dependent on the size of the area which is 
repaired. 
For a minor repair, the associated costs are therefore 
approximated by C  = 4’000US$. R
A main factor influencing the cost of failure is the 
unavailability of a tank. Whereas inspections (including 
subsequent repair) can be planned, failures may lead to an 
unplanned, immediate shut-down of parts of the installation. 
The cost of such shut-downs is highly depending on the 
operation, but in any case these costs will be huge. As a simple 
example consider a fatigue failure occurring between two 
consecutive inspection campaigns, which leads to an 
unavailability (down time) of the corresponding tank for a 
period of about 10 days. Assuming that the loss of production 
is equal to 10’000 bbl/day at a rate of 30US$ per bbl, the loss 
of production over 10 days amounts to: 10’000 x 10 x 30US$ = 
3’000’000US$. 
In the above it is assumed that a component fatigue failure 
is followed by an immediate repair in order to prevent any 
global failure scenario with much higher consequences. The 
implicit assumption – which is not always realistic – is that the 
failure is immediately detected and repaired once it occurs. In 
principle, also the influence of fatigue failures on the overall 
structural integrity should be (explicitly) accounted for. Clearly, 
fatigue failures lead to an increased risk of loss of the entire 
unit, as each failed connection will decrease the global 
structural resistance to operational and environmental loads and 
thus increase the probability of structural collapse. However, 
due to the high redundancy in floating structures, it is not 
possible to assess the member importance with a RIF value 
(RIF values would generally be very close to 1). On the other 
hand, fatigue failures will be highly inter-dependent and may 
occur in clusters, which increases the probability of a global 
collapse of the structure, see also Straub and Faber (2005a) for 
a discussion. It seems therefore not reasonable to quantify the 
cost of an individual failure event in a floating structure, as it 
has been done for platform structures. Instead, as a first 
approximation it is assumed that all fatigue failures will be 
detected and immediately repaired. Because this assumption is 
over-estimating the true costs (not all defects will be detected 
and repair may take place during the regular inspection 
campaign), it is considered that this partly accounts for 
neglecting the effect of the failure on the overall structural 
integrity. The cost of a failure is thus taken as  = 3’000’000 
US$. 
FC
For some of the hot spots, special failure scenarios become 
relevant, e.g. when the fatigue failure is located on the side 
shell and may cause pollution of the environment or for the 
case where a fatigue failure may trigger an explosion due to the 
emission of gas, as may be the case for the walls separating the 
cargo tanks and the water ballast tanks. In that case, these 
failure costs may be considered explicitly, following a 
probabilistic consequence assessment. 
BENEFITS OF RISK BASED INSPECTION PLANNING 
The benefits of performing RBI as compared to 
prescriptive inspection planning are assessed for examples of 
fixed offshore steel structures and FPSOs. 
Fixed steel structures 
In the following, the expected cost of different inspection 
planning strategies are assessed, based on the probabilistic 
deterioration model described in Faber et al. (2005) and the 
cost model presented in the previous section as it applies to 
platforms. It is assumed that the hot spot has a RIF=0.9. The 
expected cost of failure ( FC =138’000 US$), the cost of 
inspection ( =2’000US$) and the cost of repair IC
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( RC =20’000US$) follow from the pervious discussion. 
Furthermore, an interest rate of  is taken into account. 0.03r =
In Figure 8 and Figure 9, the expected cost over the life-
time (40 years) of a hot spot with FDF=2 is presented, for a 
prescriptive and a risk-based strategy respectively. The RBI 
strategies are given as a function of the maximum annual 
probability of failure, in accordance with Figure 1 and Figure 
2. The inspection times for ACFM inspections corresponding to 
the RBI strategy are shown in Figure 10.  
Although the difference between the prescriptive and the 
RBI strategies with respect to the expected cost appears small, 
this is not the case if it is reminded that the inspection plans 
must also fulfill specified acceptance criteria. In the application 
presented in Faber et al. (2005), for a hot spot with RIF=0.9, 
risk acceptance criteria demand that the annual probability of 
failure is lower than 10-3 yr-1. For the example hot spot, when 
applying a prescriptive inspection plan, this would require that 
the inspection interval is 4 years or lower. In this case, the total 
expected cost is, according to Figure 8, 17’000US$. The RBI 
plan fulfilling the acceptance criteria has a total expected cost 
of 12’500US$, Figure 9.  
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Figure 8. Expected costs for a hot spot with FDF=2 
for different equidistant inspection strategies. 
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Figure 9. Expected costs for a hot spot with FDF=2 
for different RBI strategies. 
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Figure 10. Inspection plans corresponding to 
different thresholds for a hot spot with FDF=2. 
Figure 11 and Figure 12 show the expected cost for two 
different prescriptive inspections plans, with constant 
inspection intervals of 10 and 4 years. It is reminded that only 
the second fulfills the acceptance criteria for hot spots with a 
FDF=2 (but not with a FDF=1). Figure 13 presents the 
expected cost for an RBI plan, which fulfills the acceptance 
criteria for all FDFs. It can be observed that the RBI plans lead 
to significantly lower total expected cost than the prescriptive 
plans for almost the entire range of FDFs, while at the same 
time ensuring compliance with the acceptance criteria.  
Based on the expected costs presented in Figure 11 to 
Figure 13 and the distribution of FDFs for the 4 sample 
platforms as presented in Figure 5, the total expected costs 
[ ]E TC  for the different inspection planning strategies can be 
computed. These are 
- 10 years fixed interval: [ ]E TC = 5.2 106 US$ 
- 4 years fixed interval: [ ]E TC = 11.7 106 US$ 
- RBI plan: [ ]E TC = 3.8 106 US$ 
It is observed that the application of the RBI plans result in the 
savings of 1.4 106 US$, respectively 7.9 106 US$ as compared 
to the different prescribed inspection plans. 
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Figure 11. Expected cost as a function of the FDF 
when performing inspections in a constant interval of 
10 years. 
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Figure 12. Expected cost as a function of the FDF 
when performing inspections in a constant interval of 
4 years. 
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Figure 13. Expected cost as a function of the FDF 
when applying a RBI strategy with a threshold on the 
annual probability of failure of  10-3 per year. 
 
FPSO (Example 1) 
Similar calculations as performed in the previous section 
for fixed steel offshore structures may also be carried out for 
floating units. The total expected costs of an RBI plan are 
thereby compared with the total expected cost related to the 
application of prescriptive rules. In the case of FPSOs, 
prescriptive rules are the rules issued by the classification 
societies for maintaining class. According to Bureau Veritas 
rules (2004), a special survey has to be carried out every fifth 
year when the unit is younger than 15 years. For older units, 
the required inspection interval is reduced to 2.5 years. As may 
be observed from Table 2, the required inspection times 
(applying Alternate Current Field Measurements, ACFM) vary 
significantly when applying a RBI strategy, although a direct 
comparison is not valid, because inspections must also be 
carried out for assessing other degradation, in particular 
corrosion. Because a large part of the inspection cost is related 
to assessing the hot spots, the expected cost related to the 
different inspections must be considered jointly. However, a 
RBI study can be performed including all different types of 
degradation. 
Note that the RBI calculations for the FPSOs are based on 
the probabilistic models presented in Goyet et al. (2004). 
Table 2. Inspection times [yr] for 7 representatives 
FDF values on FPSO 1. 
FDF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1.58                
2.51                
3.50                
4.27                
5.54                
6.45                
7.45                 
 
As an example, the expected cost for a hot spot with 
FDF=2.4 and service life time 15yr is shown in Figure 14. The 
costs as utilized in the calculations follow from the previous 
discussion and are FC =3’000’000 US$, =500US$ and 
=4’000US$, the interest rate is . 
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Figure 14. Expected costs for a specific connection 
on FPSO 1 (with FDF=2.41) and various thresholds. 
 
Due to the fact that the times for fatigue inspection for the 
most critical set of components were found close to the usual 
inspection times (years 2.5, 5, 7.5, 10, 12.5 and 15), it was 
decided to fit the fatigue inspections to the usual inspection 
campaigns required by the class. In addition, it was possible to 
reduce the amount of inspections by considering systems 
effects (see, e.g., Straub and Faber (2005b)): As a consequence, 
only 50% of the NDT inspections must be performed every 2.5 
years. Therefore, only 50% of the wing tanks are inspected 
every 2.5 years, and the inspection interval for those tanks is 
thus increased to 5 years. Only a reference group of cargo tanks 
will be inspected directly according to the plan coming from 
the detailed RBI (as in Table 2), to verify the assumptions made 
regarding system effects. For ballast tanks, system effects were 
not considered. 
FPSO (Example 2) 
FPSO 2 is not under the class regime for in-service life. 
Therefore, a RBI approach has been applied for determining 
inspection plans for the unit. Based on FDF values shown in 
Figure 6, the so called “equidistant RBI approach” (see Faber 
et al., 2000) was used to determine the optimal periodicity of 
inspection campaigns, i.e., the inspection intervals required for 
fulfilling the acceptance criteria. The distribution of the 
inspection intervals calculated for two different tanks is 
presented in Figure 15. It is required to distinguish the two 
tanks under consideration: 
For the condensate tank almost all of the hot spots require 
an inspection each 5 years or each 4.3 years. 
For the water ballast tank, most of the hot spots require an 
inspection each 5 years or each 10 years, but a small number of 
hot spots - basically the ones at the bottom shell connections - 
require more frequent inspections. 
The inspections times were determined for close visual 
inspection, which is the usual way of inspection in maritime 
transportation. In a second step, other, more accurate NDT 
techniques with higher probability of detection (PoD) were 
used to extend the frequency of inspection of the most critical 
components. This illustrates the flexibility of RBI, which 
allows for adaptations and modifications when required. 
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Figure 15. Distribution of the inspection (close visual) 
periodicity as determined for 2 tanks on FPSO 2. 
 
DISCUSSION 
In the paper, the benefits of RBI are presented for 
examples of fixed steel structures as well as floating structures 
(FPSOs). For fixed structures it has been demonstrated that the 
application of RBI plans may lead to significant economical 
benefits, which are in the range of one to several million US$ 
for the four example platforms, depending on the alternatively 
applied prescribed inspection plans. In addition, the RBI plans 
ensure that the acceptance criteria with respect to risk to 
personnel and the environment are fulfilled, which is not the 
case when prescriptive inspection planning is performed. For 
FPSOs, it has been outlined on two examples that the 
application of RBI plans facilitates the targeted application of 
inspections. Only the detailed fatigue calculations, which are 
performed as part of the RBI study, allow the identification of 
the critical details (hot spots) in the structure. These have been 
found to be different ones for the two considered FPSOs (the 
side shell longitudinal connections in the conversion FPSO and 
the bottom longitudinal connections in the purpose-built 
FPSO). On this basis, a significant reduction of inspection 
efforts on the non-critical elements has been achieved, while 
ensuring sufficient inspection coverage of the critical hot spots. 
The examples underline the fact RBI allows to fit inspection 
efforts to the requirements in terms of acceptance criteria for 
each component individually and thus leads to a significant 
(economical) benefit. 
In addition to a direct reduction of the total expected cost, 
RBI enhances the understanding of the structural integrity. 
Because RBI requires a detailed analysis of the structure, the 
deterioration processes as well as the inspection performances, 
it helps to identify the “weak points” of the structure. For some 
structures, the RBI study may thus result in a recommendation 
for additional mitigation measures, which are more efficient 
than an increased inspection effort. Following the same line-of-
thought, it would also be highly beneficial to perform a RBI 
study already during the design of a new structure. Considering 
the examples presented in this paper, it would, e.g., be possible 
to identify a cost optimal FDF values for the hot spots, when 
the construction cost is included in the analysis. 
For most new-built fixed offshore structures, fatigue 
calculations are performed at the design stage for all hot spots. 
For existing structures, however, such calculations are often not 
available and are thus carried out as part of the RBI study. For 
FPSOs, fatigue calculations are generally available only for a 
selection of hot spots which are considered critical, although 
there is a tendency towards demanding more extensive fatigue 
assessments. Independently of whether or not fatigue 
calculations are available for all hot spots, RBI procedures are 
based on a model of the structure which is not perfect. This is 
reflected by the fact that fatigue cracks occur at hot spot areas 
where they were not expected. It is thus of utmost importance 
that besides the detailed inspections planned according to RBI, 
general (visual) inspections are performed to ensure the validity 
of the assumptions made in the RBI analysis. The inspection 
planning procedures must then ensure that fatigue calculations 
and consequently the RBI analyses are revised when such 
general inspections reveal defects which were not anticipated. 
It is noted that RBI is increasingly required by owners and 
operators of offshore structures. For owners and operators, the 
primary objective of RBI is to maximize safety, to minimize 
costs and to gain a technical understanding of the behavior and 
performance of the facilities. It can be observed from the calls 
for tenders that operators are moving from a reactive to a 
proactive vision through the introduction of risk-based, 
optimized inspection programs. In the case of FPSOs, risk-
based schemes are implemented as an alternative to or in 
parallel with class inspection rules and flag state requirements. 
This is also true for fixed steel offshore structures, where RBI 
and certification are related integrity management tools.  
Furthermore, many call for tenders nowadays explicitly require 
the demonstration of compliance with risk acceptance criteria. 
These prescribe that risks to personnel arising from 
consequences of loss of pressure containment or structural 
failure have to be retained below some limits as specified by 
national authorities or operators and owners. Such acceptance 
criteria may be expressed for example in terms of average FAR, 
location-specific FAR or individual risk, Straub and Faber 
(2005a). It is clear that only inspection plans based on RBI are 
able to demonstrate compliance with the acceptance criteria. 
CONCLUSIONS 
By consideration of examples of fixed offshore steel 
structures and FPSOs subject to fatigue deterioration, the 
benefits of RBI are presented and discussed. It is demonstrated 
that the financial benefits in terms of the expected total life-
cycle cost are huge. Furthermore, it is observed that only RBI 
plans ensure compliance of the structures with risk acceptance 
criteria and its documentation. Finally, the analyses required by 
RBI enhance the understanding of the relevant degradation 
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processes and may thus lead to an improved structural integrity 
management beyond the optimization of inspection activities. 
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